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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
McKEE, Circuit Judge. 
 
Luis Fuentes appeals a judgment that was entered for the 
defendant corrections officers and prison officials in this 
suit under 42 U. S. C. S 1983. The suit arose from an 
incident that occurred in the Berks County Prison where 
Fuentes was detained while awaiting sentencing on 
outstanding federal charges. Fuentes alleged a cause of 
action for excessive force under the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments, a substantive due process claim for cruel and 
unusual punishment under the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments, a procedural due process claim under the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Mr. Fuentes was granted in forma pauperis status, and counsel agreed 
to represent him pro bono. We express our appreciation for the service 
counsel provided the court, and the quality of their advocacy on behalf 
of Mr. Fuentes. 
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Fourteenth Amendment, and state law claims for assault 
and battery, and false imprisonment.2 
 
Cross-motions for summary judgment were eventually 
filed, and the Magistrate Judge to whom the matter had 
been assigned granted summary judgment in favor of the 
prison officials on Fuentes' substantive due process claim, 
but denied summary judgment on the remaining claims. 
Those remaining claims then proceeded to trial, and a jury 
returned a verdict in favor of the defendants. Fuentes' post- 
trial motions were denied, and this appeal followed. 3 We will 
affirm. 
 
I. BACKGROUND 
 
In December of 1995, Fuentes was being housed in the 
behavioral adjustment unit ("BAU") of the Berks County 
Prison awaiting sentencing on federal drug charges to 
which he had previously pled guilty. His cell was typical of 
the cells in the BAU. It measured approximately 6 by 10 
feet and contained only a sink, a toilet, and a cement slab. 
 
On December 28, 1995, the inmates in the BAU were not 
allowed their one-hour exercise period outdoors because of 
inclement weather. Instead, they were individually released 
from their cells to exercise in the hallway immediately 
outside their respective cells. After another inmatefinished 
exercising, Fuentes began kicking his own cell door and 
yelling for a Correctional Officer ("CO"). 4 CO Konemann and 
CO Kleeman came to Fuentes' cell, and Fuentes complained 
that another inmate had urinated into Fuentes' cell. Neither 
Konemann nor Kleeman saw any urine on Fuentes' cell 
floor. However, Kleeman did notice some wetness on the 
door and the floor outside of Fuentes' cell. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Fuentes filed a pro se complaint on January 11, 1996. Thereafter, he 
was granted ifp status and counsel was appointed to represent him. A 
first amended complaint was filed on February 28, 1997, and a second 
amended complaint was filed on November 14, 1997. 
3. All parties consented to have the Magistrate Judge conduct the 
proceedings under 28 U. S. C. S 636(c)(1). Fuentes retained the right to 
appeal directly to us under 28 U. S. C. S 636(c)(3). 
 
4. Fuentes knew that kicking his cell door was a violation of the rules of 
the BAU. 
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Policy requires that a CO handcuff an inmate who is 
housed in the disciplinary unit before entering his cell. 
Accordingly, Konemann and Kleeman told Fuentes to 
extend his hands through the food slot of his cell door so 
that they could handcuff him and enter his cell. Fuentes 
complied, and was handcuffed. The COs entered and told 
Fuentes they were going to strip his cell because he had 
kicked his cell door.5 However, as Konemann began 
removing sheets from Fuentes' bed in an effort to strip the 
cell, Fuentes grabbed the sheets and a struggle ensued. The 
parties offer different versions of exactly what happened 
next. 
 
According to the defendants, Fuentes swung at 
Konemann's head with his handcuffed fists after 
unsuccessfully trying to grab the sheets. Konemann stated 
he saw Fuentes' swing, and that he pushed Fuentes 
backwards. When Fuentes moved back toward Konemann, 
Kleeman stepped forward and wrestled Fuentes to thefloor. 
Fuentes was then face down on the cell floor with his 
handcuffed arms beneath him. Kleeman was partially on 
top of Fuentes as Konemann assisted in holding Fuentes 
down. According to the defendants, Fuentes was combative 
and was trying to free himself as Konemann and Kleeman 
tried to control him. 
 
CO Donato arrived shortly after Konemann and Kleeman 
began stripping the cell, but Donato left to get leg shackles 
and to call for assistance. After Donato retrieved the leg 
shackles she returned with several other COs, and the 
shackles were fastened around Fuentes' legs. Sergeant 
Brown, a supervising CO, did not enter Fuentes' cell, but 
he did hear Fuentes yelling at Kleeman and Konemann. 
Donato told Brown that Konemann and Kleeman had been 
stripping Fuentes' cell when Fuentes swung at Konemann. 
Brown then left to obtain permission to place Fuentes in a 
restraint chair. Permission was granted by Assistant 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Cell stripping is a procedure which may be used when an inmate is 
causing a disturbance. It consists of removing from the cell all items 
except the clothes on the inmate's back, his legal papers and his 
toothbrush. For the first violation, the cell is stripped for 24 hours. 
For 
 
each subsequent infraction, an additional 24 hours is added. 
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Warden, who authorized use of the restraint chair for eight 
hours. Fuentes' civil rights claim is based upon the use of 
that restraint chair and his allegation that Konemann and 
Kleeman used excessive force during the initial 
confrontation in his cell.6 
 
Fuentes was no longer physically resisting when Brown 
returned with permission to use the restraint chair. 
However, Kleeman and Konemann were still holding 
Fuentes down, and Fuentes was threatening to "get" 
Konemann. Fuentes was then carried from his cell to a 
nearby cell where he was placed in the restraint chair. He 
did not resist physically being placed in the chair, though 
he did not cooperate. 
 
With regard to the initial confrontation in Fuentes' cell, 
Fuentes alleged that Konemann and Kleeman threw him to 
the floor and beat him, and that Kleeman smeared his hand 
all over Fuentes' face. Fuentes denied trying to strike 
Konemann or threatening him. Fuentes insisted that he 
only asked Kleeman and Konemann why they were hitting 
him, and he claimed to have remained still from the time he 
was beaten until the time he was placed in the restraint 
chair. Kleeman admitted that Fuentes was no longer a 
threat to himself or anyone else once his hands were cuffed 
and his legs shackled. From the time Fuentes was removed 
from his cell to the time he was placed in the restraint 
chair, he was neither resisting nor physically combative. 
Fuentes was not given an opportunity to explain or defend 
any of his actions prior to being placed in the chair. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. The restraint chair at Berks County Prison is the "Pro-straint Violent 
Prisoner Chair." The back of the chair is angled back at a 45#DE# angle. 
An 
 
inmate is placed in the chair with his arms handcuffed behind his back 
and his legs shackled. A restraint belt is fastened across the inmate's 
lap, and two more restraint belts are placed across his chest while 
another restraint belt secures his ankles. At Berks County Prison, it is 
standard operating procedure to shackle an inmate's legs, as well as 
cuffing his wrists. The handcuffs that are used are double-locked so they 
cannot loosen or tighten more than when initially set. The prison has 
three restraint chairs, and they are on wheels so that they can be moved 
between housing units. They are used in the female unit, the disciplinary 
unit and the mental health unit. The chairs are not used on general 
population inmates. 
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Fuentes' confinement in the restraint chair was 
consistent with the institution's policy. COs checked him at 
fifteen minute intervals and he was released every two 
hours for a ten minute period of stretching, exercise, and 
use of the toilet. In addition, he was given a meal and seen 
by the medical staff at the end of the first two hour interval. 
The parties disputed whether Fuentes made any verbal 
threats during his first release period. Fuentes denied doing 
so, however, Konemann said that Fuentes was still 
threatening him and saying that he would "get" Konemann 
when he got out on the street. 
 
During the second release period, which came at the end 
of four hours, Fuentes told Konemann "he wasn't going to 
get away with it, that [Fuentes] was going to see him sooner 
or later . . . ." Konemann interpreted this as a threat. 
However, Fuentes claimed that he only meant that he was 
going to sue Konemann. 
 
When the third release period arrived, Fuentes had 
stopped making threats. He was finally released at the end 
of eight hours and examined by a staff nurse, as dictated 
by policy. She noted that Fuentes complained of pain in his 
right lower rib cage, but she observed no injuries with the 
exception of small bruises or swelling on both wrists. 
 
On December 29, 1995, Fuentes was brought before the 
prison disciplinary board for a hearing on charges of 
assault/fighting/horseplay, threats, refusal of orders, and 
disturbance. He was given an opportunity to make a 
statement. The assault charge was dismissed but the board 
found him guilty of threats, refusal of orders and 
disturbance. Sanctions in the form of loss of all earned time 
credit and thirty days segregation were imposed. 
 
Fuentes claimed that being in the restraint chair for eight 
hours resulted in loss of feeling in his hands and feet, cuts 
on his wrists and ankles where he had been handcuffed 
and shackled, leg cramps, discomfort in his arms, 
restricted breathing, and back pain. 
 
II. DISCUSSION 
 
Fuentes argues that the Magistrate Judge erred by: (1) 
denying his motion for judgment as a matter of law on his 
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procedural due process claim; (2) granting summary 
judgment in favor of the defendants on his substantive due 
process claim; and (3) instructing the jury improperly on 
his excessive force claim. 
 
A. The Procedural Due Process Claim. 
 
Fuentes alleged that his eight hour confinement in the 
restraint chair violated the Fourteenth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution. The Magistrate Judge denied 
cross-motions for summary judgment on the procedural 
due process claim after finding that "the evidence 
demonstrates a genuine issue of material fact as to whether 
Mr. Fuentes was placed in the restraint chair for punitive 
reasons or security reasons. . . ." Op. at 15. After the jury 
found against him on his procedural due process claim, 
Fuentes moved for judgment as a matter of law. However, 
the Magistrate Judge denied that motion. Fuentes claims 
that was error. 
 
We exercise plenary review over the denial of a motion for 
judgment as a matter of law, and we apply the same 
standard that the District Court should have used. 
Lightning Lube, Inc. v. Witco Corp., 4 F.3d 1153, 1166 (3d 
Cir. 1993). A motion for judgment as a matter of law 
"should be granted only if, viewing the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the nonmovant . . . there is insufficient 
evidence from which a jury could reasonably find[for the 
nonmovant]. [We] may not weigh the evidence. . . The 
question is not whether there is literally no evidence 
supporting the party against whom the motion is directed 
but whether there is evidence upon which the jury could 
properly find a verdict for that party." Id . A jury must 
resolve any factual conflicts, not a court. Bonjorno v. Kaiser 
Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 752 F.2d 802, 811 (3d Cir. 
1985). 
 
When Fuentes was placed in the restraint chair he was a 
convicted inmate awaiting sentencing. His status under the 
Constitution was therefore that of a pretrial detainee.7 In 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. Before the Magistrate Judge, the defendants conceded that for 
purposes of his S 1983 claim, Fuentes was to be regarded as a pretrial 
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Cobb v. Aytch, 643 F.2d 946, 962 (3d Cir. 1981), we 
clarified the legal status of convicted, but unsentenced, 
inmates. We stated: 
 
       The trial judge, in fashioning relief, drew a distinction 
       between pretrial detainees and convicted but 
       unsentenced inmates. He concluded that `the 
       conviction alone appears to extinguish any `liberty' 
       interest formally derived from the fourteenth 
       amendment.' We disagree. The right to remain at liberty 
       continues until a court pronounces a judgment of 
       sentence, although after a jury has pronounced a guilty 
       verdict the court may insist upon greater assurance that 
       a defendant will submit to sentence. 
 
(emphasis added). Given Fuentes' status as a pretrial 
detainee under the Fourteenth Amendment, he has 
 
       federally protected liberty interests that are different in 
       kind from those of sentenced inmates. Unlike 
       sentenced prisoners, who . . . must look to state law 
       for the protection of their personal liberties, pre-trial 
       detainees have liberty interests firmly grounded in 
       federal constitutional law. 
 
Id. at 957.8 
 
Our analysis of Fuentes' procedural due process claim is 
governed by Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S. 520 (1979).9 There, 
the Supreme Court wrote: 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
detainee. Op. at 9 n.17. In this appeal, the defendants argue that 
Fuentes' status is the same as a sentenced inmate. See Appellees' Br. at 
13, 20. We reject that argument because it contravenes the concession 
made before the Magistrate Judge, and because it is simply wrong. See 
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 538 (1979). 
 
8. Fuentes' liberty interests are grounded in the Fourteenth Amendment 
because his allegations are against state actors as he was confined in a 
county prison. 
 
9. The defendants, although discussing Bell v. Wolfish, rely, in part, on 
Sandin v. Conner, 515 U. S. 472 (1995), in support of their argument 
that Fuentes was not punished without due process of law. In Sandin, 
the Court held that liberty interests protected by the Due Process Clause 
"will be generally limited to freedom from restraint which, while not 
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       [I]n evaluating the constitutionality of conditions or 
       restrictions of pretrial detention that implicate only the 
       protection against deprivation of liberty without due 
       process of law, we think the proper inquiry is whether 
       those conditions amount to punishment of the 
       detainee. 
 
Id. at 535. "[A] detainee may not be punished prior to an 
adjudication of guilt in accordance with due process of 
law." Id. However, "[o]nce the Government has exercised its 
conceded authority to detain a person pending trial, it 
obviously is entitled to employ devices that are calculated 
to effectuate this detention." Id. at 537. Thus, "[r]estraints 
that are reasonably related to the institution's interest in 
maintaining jail security do not, without more, constitute 
unconstitutional punishment, even if they are 
discomforting. . . ." Id. at 540. Obviously, "ensuring 
security and order at the institution is a permissible 
nonpunitive objective, whether the facility houses pretrial 
detainees, convicted inmates, or both." Id.  at 561. 
Consequently, "whether . . . restrictions and practices 
constitute punishment in the constitutional sense depends 
on whether they are rationally related to a legitimate 
nonpunitive government purpose and whether they appear 
excessive in relation to that purpose." Id.  Thus, there is a 
"distinction between punitive measures that may not 
constitutionally be imposed prior to a determination of guilt 
and regulatory restraints that may." Id. 
 
       [We] must decide whether the disability is imposed for 
       the purpose of punishment or whether it is but an 
       incident of some other legitimate governmental 
       purpose. Absent a showing of an expressed intent to 
       punish on the part of detention facility officials, that 
       determination generally will turn on whether an 
       alternative purpose to which [the restriction] may 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
exceeding the sentence in such an unexpected manner as to give rise to 
protection by the Due Process Clause in its own force, nonetheless 
imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to 
the ordinary incidents of prison life." 515 U. S. at 484. However, Sandin 
does not apply here. Sandin concerned punishment of a sentenced 
prisoner, and therefore required a completely different analysis. 
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       rationally be connected is assignable for it, and 
       whether it appears excessive in relation to the 
 659alternative purpose assigned [to it]. Thus, if a 
 
       particular condition or restriction of pretrial detention 
       is reasonably related to a legitimate governmental 
       objective, it does not, without more, amount to 
       `punishment.' Conversely, if a restriction or condition is 
       not reasonably related to a legitimate goal--if it is 
       arbitrary or purposeless--a court permissibly may infer 
       that the purpose of the governmental action is 
       punishment that may not constitutionally be inflicted 
       upon detainees qua detainees. 
 
Id. at 538-39. 
 
Fuentes has not clearly established that officials used the 
restraint chair as a means of "punishing" (as opposed to 
controlling) him. Accordingly, we must determine if this 
particular restriction, which may appear to be punitive, was 
really an incident of a legitimate nonpunitive objective. Id. 
at 539 n.20. "[A]bsent a showing of intent to punish, a 
court must determine if a particular restriction or 
condition, which may on its face appear to be punishment, 
is instead but an incident of a legitimate nonpunitive 
governmental objective." Id. "Retribution and deterrence are 
not legitimate nonpunitive governmental objectives." Id. 
 
Fuentes argues that "a reasonable jury could only have 
concluded that the defendants confined [him] in the 
restraint chair -- and kept him there for eight long 
hours -- to punish him." Appellant's Br. at 38-39. He 
therefore claims that the Magistrate Judge erred in denying 
his motion for judgment as a matter of law. 
 
Clearly, there is evidence in this record from which a 
reasonable jury could conclude that use of the restraint 
chair was punishment. Sergeant Brown testified that the 
chair is used in the disciplinary unit for behavior 
modification purposes. Warden Wagner testified that the 
restraint chair is used to abate an inmate's behavior, and 
that it is used for behavior modification and control. 
Perhaps most significantly, he also testified that there is 
nothing the inmate can do to affect the amount of time he 
will remain in the chair once the inmate is placed in it. 
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However, there is also evidence from which a reasonable 
jury could conclude that Fuentes was placed in the 
restraint chair to quell a disturbance and restore the order 
and security of the institution. Kleeman testified that the 
restraint chair is used to handle an aggressive inmate who 
is causing harm to himself or others. Kleeman and 
Konemann both testified that Fuentes kicked his cell door 
and swung his handcuffed hands at Konemann's head. 
Konemann testified that although Fuentes was not 
physically aggressive when released from the chair during 
the first and second rest periods, Fuentes did continue to 
make threats. 
 Given this conflicting evidence, we disagree with Fuentes' 
contention that a reasonable jury could only conclude that 
use of the chair was punitive. The evidence was sufficient 
to allow a jury to conclude that he was placed in the 
restraint chair to stop his disruptive behavior and maintain 
prison order and security. Accordingly, the Magistrate 
Judge did not err in denying Fuentes' motion for judgment 
as a matter of law. "Conflicting evidence which could 
reasonably lead to inconsistent conclusions will not justify" 
a judgment as a matter of law. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. 
Videfreeze Corp., 540 F.2d 1171, 1178 (3d Cir. 1976). "It is 
the function of the trier of fact alone, the jury in this 
instance, to evaluate the evidence and to draw inferences 
therefrom." Id. 
 
B. The Substantive Due Process Claim.10 
 
Fuentes alleged that the use of the restraint chair 
violated his substantive due process rights under the 
Fourteenth Amendment, and constituted cruel and unusual 
punishment under the Eighth Amendment as a matter of 
law. However, the basis of his claim is elusive. The 
Magistrate Judge concluded that Fuentes was claiming that 
the use of the restraint chair is unconstitutional under any 
circumstances under the Eighth Amendment. See  Op. at 15 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. We exercise plenary review over the grant or denial of a motion for 
summary judgment, applying the same standard that the district court 
should have used in the first instance. Olson v. General Elec. Aerospace, 
101 F.3d 947, 951 (3d Cir. 1996). 
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("[Fuentes] contends that the use of the restraint chair as 
a means of corporal punishment is `cruel and unusual' and 
violates the Eighth Amendment."). However, in his brief to 
us, Fuentes conflates his substantive due process claim 
into his procedural due process claim by arguing that the 
central issue with respect to both is whether the use of the 
chair constituted punishment. The appellees describe 
Fuentes argument before us as follows: 
 
       [Fuentes] appears to now contend that the district 
       court should have considered only whether [he] was 
       punished, not whether the alleged punishment was 
       cruel and unusual. [Thus, Fuentes'] argument with 
       respect to the district court's ruling on [the substantive 
       due process claim] relating to claims of cruel and 
       unusual punishment is confusing at best. 
 
See Appellees' Br. at 9. 
 Fuentes argues that the Magistrate Judge incorrectly 
analyzed his substantive due process claim under the 
Eighth Amendment rather than under the Fourteenth 
Amendment. He correctly asserts that his claim is governed 
by the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of due process, 
and not the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel 
and unusual punishment because he had not been 
sentenced when the incident occurred.11  Under the 
Fourteenth Amendment, a pretrial detainee is entitled "at a 
minimum, [to] no less protection" than a sentenced inmate 
is entitled to under the Eighth Amendment. Colburn v. 
Upper Darby Township, 838 F.2d 663, 668 (3d Cir. 1988). 
Fuentes claims that "the district court never even 
considered the amount of additional substantive protection 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. "The Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause was designed to 
protect those convicted of crimes and consequently the Clause applies 
only after the State has complied with the constitutional guarantees 
traditionally associated with criminal prosecutions." Whitley v. Albers, 
475 U. S. 312, 318 (1986)(citation and internal quotations omitted). 
Thus, its protections do not apply until "after conviction and sentence." 
Graham v. Connor, 490 U. S. 386, 392 n.6 (1989). The clause, and 
indeed the entire Eighth Amendment, is made applicable to the states 
through the Fourteenth Amendment. Robinson v. California, 370 U. S. 
660 (1962). 
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to which [he] was entitled" under the Fourteenth 
Amendment by virtue of his status as a pretrial detainee. 
Appellant's Br. at 18-19. 
 
In Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 188 n.10 (3d Cir. 
1993), we noted that "pretrial detainees. . . are entitled to 
at least as much protection as convicted prisoners, so the 
protections of the Eighth Amendment would seem to 
establish a floor of sorts. It appears that no determination 
has as yet been made regarding how much more protection 
unconvicted prisoners should receive." Fuentes contends 
that, as an unsentenced inmate, he was entitled to be free 
from any punishment. However, that very issue was before 
the jury with respect to Fuentes' procedural due process 
claim, and, as we have indicated, the jury's determination 
in favor of the defendants on that issue was supported by 
sufficient evidence. Accordingly, even if the Magistrate 
Judge had applied a Fourteenth Amendment standard, 
Fuentes would not have prevailed at trial. 
 
The Eighth Amendment protects against infliction of 
"cruel and unusual punishment." However, "not every 
governmental action affecting the interests or well-being of 
a prisoner is subject to Eighth Amendment scrutiny." 
Whitley v. Albers, 475 U. S. 312, 319 (1986)."After 
incarceration, only the unnecessary and wanton infliction 
of pain constitutes cruel and unusual punishment 
forbidden by the Eighth Amendment." Id. (citation and 
internal quotations omitted). "It is obduracy and 
wantonness, not inadvertence or error in good faith, that 
characterize the conduct prohibited by the Cruel and 
Unusual Punishments Clause, whether that conduct occurs 
in connection with establishing conditions of confinement, 
supplying medical needs, or restoring official control over a 
tumultuous cellblock." Id. 
 
Resolution of an Eighth Amendment claim therefore 
"mandate[s] an inquiry into a prison official's state of 
mind." Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U. S. 294, 299 (1991). Two 
considerations define that inquiry. We must first determine 
if the deprivation was sufficiently serious to fall within the 
Eighth Amendment's zone of protections. Id. at 298. If not, 
our inquiry is at an end. However, if the deprivation is 
sufficiently serious, we must determine if the officials acted 
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with a sufficiently culpable state of mind. Id . In other 
words, we must determine if they were motivated by a 
desire to inflict unnecessary and wanton pain."What is 
necessary to establish an `unnecessary and wanton 
infliction of pain'. . . varies according to the nature of the 
alleged constitutional violation." Hudson v. McMillian, 503 
U. S. 1, 5 (1992). 
 
When excessive force is alleged in the context of a prison 
disturbance, the subjective inquiry is "whether force was 
applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore 
discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm." 
Id. at 7. The objective inquiry is whether the inmate's injury 
was more than de minimis. Id. at 9-10. 
 
When an Eighth Amendment claim arises in the context 
of a challenge to conditions of confinement, we must 
determine if prison officials acted with "deliberate 
indifference" to the inmate's health. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 
U. S. 825, 837 (1994).12 The objective inquiry is whether the 
inmate was "denied the minimal civilized measure of life's 
necessities." Hudson, 503 U. S. at 9. 
 
Fuentes contends that his substantive due process claim 
does not neatly fit into either the "excessive force" category 
or the "conditions of confinement" category. Nonetheless, he 
argues, not only that the Magistrate Judge erred by 
granting summary judgment to the prison officials on his 
hybrid substantive due process claim, but also that he 
should have been granted summary judgment on that 
claim. He argues in the alternative that the claim should at 
least have been submitted to the jury. We disagree. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. In Farmer v. Brennan, the Court finally defined "deliberate 
indifference," which first appeared in Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U. S. 97, 
104 (1976). The Court required a showing that the prison official was 
"subjectively aware of the risk." 511 U. S. at 829. It wrote: "We hold 
. . . that a prison official cannot be found liable under the Eighth 
Amendment for denying an inmate humane conditions of confinement 
unless the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate 
health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the 
inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, 
and he must also draw the inference." Id. at 837. 
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Fuentes' due process claim is limited to use of the 
restraint chair. It does not encompass the force initially 
used to subdue him, or to place him in the chair. 
Accordingly, whether analyzed as an excessive force claim 
or a conditions of confinement claim, Fuentes had to 
demonstrate that the prison officials had a "sufficiently 
culpable state of mind," to establish that use of the 
restraint violated the Eighth Amendment. It is obvious that 
prison officials were not "deliberately indifferent" to his 
health or well-being in employing the restraint chair, and a 
conditions of confinement analysis therefore requires little 
discussion. 
 
It is undisputed that the prison policy for the use of the 
restraint chair was followed here. Accordingly, Fuentes was 
not kept in the chair any longer than had been authorized, 
his physical condition was checked every 15 minutes, and 
he was released every two hours for 10 minutes to allow 
stretching, exercise, and use of the toilet. He was given 
food, and he was examined by a nurse at the end of the 
eight hour confinement.13 
 
Moreover, even if we assume that the injuries Fuentes 
alleges were sufficiently serious to establish an Eighth 
Amendment violation, there is no evidence that prison 
officials placed him in the chair "maliciously and 
sadistically to cause harm." Fuentes argues that the prison 
officials' conduct was malicious and sadistic because (1) 
there was no need to use the restraint chair; (2) the 
restraint chair was much too severe a response under the 
circumstances; (3) the prison officials did not perceive him 
as an immediate threat when they placed him in the chair; 
and (4) the prison officials made no effort to temper the 
severity of their response even though it was clear that he 
posed no threat to institutional security. Appellant's Br. at 
30. However, even if we concede each of these assertions, 
Fuentes has established at most that prison officials over- 
reacted to the disturbance that he caused. Given the 
totality of the circumstances surrounding use of the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. These same factors that establish that the prison officials were not 
deliberately indifferent also establish that Fuentes was not "denied the 
minimal civilized measure of life's necessities." 
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restraint chair here, any such over-reaction would still fall 
short of supporting a finding that prison officials acted 
"maliciously and sadistically to cause harm." 
 
Consequently, the Magistrate Judge did not err by 
granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants on 
Fuentes' substantive due process claim. 
 
C. The Jury Instructions on Excessive Force. 14 
 
Fuentes alleged that Konemann and Kleeman used 
excessive force in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Fuentes also alleged that Donato was liable because she 
observed the use of excessive force and failed to intervene 
with respect to the initial confrontation in his cell. Over 
Fuentes' objection, the Magistrate Judge charged the jury 
on excessive force as follows: 
 
       [P]laintiff must show by a preponderance of the 
       evidence, that one or more of the defendants inflicted 
       unnecessary and wanton pain and suffering. You must 
       decide whether the force applied was in a good faith 
       effort to maintain or restore discipline, in which case, 
       you must find that the defendants did not use 
       excessive force, or whether the force applies (sic) was 
       inspired by an unwise, excessive zeal, amounting to an 
       abuse of official power, that shocks the conscience, in 
       which case, you must find that one or more of the 
       defendants did use excessive force. 
 
Fuentes argues that this charge "compelled [him] to meet 
a much higher burden than an unsentenced inmate is 
required to meet in order to prove an excessive force claim." 
Appellant's Br. at 47. He argues that the "objective 
reasonableness" instruction he proposed should have been 
given to the jury instead.15 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
14. We exercise plenary review in determining whether jury instructions 
misstated an applicable legal standard. Parks v. AlliedSignal, Inc., 113 
F.3d 1327, 1330 (3d Cir.1997). 
 15. Fuentes' proposed excessive force jury instruction reads: 
 
       In order to prove that the defendants used excessive and 
       unnecessary force, the plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of 
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However, Fuentes was not entitled to an "objective 
reasonableness" instruction. The "objective reasonableness" 
test has its constitutional foundation in the Fourth 
Amendment and is properly applied in excessive force 
claims arising from investigatory stops and/or arrests. 
Graham v. Connor, 490 U. S. 386 (1989). The Court in 
Graham specifically stated: 
 
       Our cases have not resolved the question of whether 
       the Fourth Amendment continues to provide 
       individuals with protection against the deliberate use of 
       force beyond the point at which arrest ends and 
       pretrial detention begins, and we do not attempt to 
       answer that question today. It is clear, however, that 
       the Due Process Clause protects a pretrial detainee from 
       the use of excessive force that amounts to punishment. 
 
490 U. S. at 395 n.10 (citations omitted)(emphasis added). 
 
Our conclusion that Fuentes was not entitled to an 
"objective reasonableness" instruction does not, however, 
completely meet Fuentes' claim of error. Fuentes' essential 
point is that the instruction given to the jury was an Eighth 
Amendment excessive force instruction applicable to 
sentenced inmates and inapplicable to him. He argues that 
his excessive force claim should have been analyzed under 
the Bell v. Wolfish "conditions of confinement" standard 
because he was a pretrial detainee. He insists that he was 
not required to prove that he experienced "wanton pain and 
suffering" or to establish that the application of force upon 
him "was inspired by an unwise, excessive zeal, amounting 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       the evidence: (1) that the plaintiff suffered some harm, (2) that 
the 
       harm resulted directly from the use of force that was clearly 
       excessive in relation to any need for the use of force, and (3) 
that 
the 
       excessiveness of the force was objectively unreasonable in light of 
       the facts and circumstances at the time. 
 
       Some of the factors you may consider in determining whether the 
       defendants used excessive force are: (1) the extent of the injury 
       suffered, (2) the need for the use of force, (3) the relationship 
       between that need and the amount of force used, (4) the threat 
       reasonably perceived by the prison guards involved; and (5) any 
       efforts made to temper the severity of the forceful response. 
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to an abuse of official power" or to prove that the conduct 
of Konemann, Kleeman and Donato "shocked the 
conscience." 
 
However, we agree with the contrary analysis in Valencia 
v. Wiggins, 981 F.2d 1440 (5th Cir. 1993). There, the court 
also addressed a pretrial detainee's excessive force claim 
against a prison guard. The claim arose from a prison 
disturbance. The court initially looked to Bell v. Wolfish for 
guidance in determining the standards to be applied. 
However, it found that Bell, while working"well for claims 
of improper conditions or restrictions, . . . does not lend 
itself to analysis of claims of excessive force in controlling 
prison disturbances." Id. at 1446. The court reasoned: 
 
       In Bell, the Court stated that the government must be 
       able to take steps to maintain security and that 
       "[r]estraints that are reasonably related to the 
       institution's interest in maintaining jail security do not, 
       without more, constitute unconstitutional punishment 
       . . . ." Bell further noted that there is no reason to 
       distinguish between pretrial detainees and convicted 
       inmates in reviewing challenged security practices 
       because there is no basis to conclude that pretrial 
       detainees pose any lesser security risk than convicted 
       inmates. 
 
       For these reasons, we conclude that excessive use of 
       force claims by pretrial detainees should not be 
       analyzed under Bell's conditions of confinement 
       standard. Instead, we are guided by the standard 
       announced in Whitley and Hudson. While these cases 
       specifically addressed claims of excessive use of force 
       brought by convicted prisoners, it is impractical to 
       draw a line between convicted prisoners and pretrial 
       detainees for the purpose of maintaining jail security. 
       Moreover, the Court indicated in Hudson that many of 
       its concerns in Whitley were not limited to Eighth 
       Amendment claims but "arise whenever guards use 
       force to keep order." It further observed that claims 
       based on excessive force and claims based on 
       conditions of confinement are different in kind. 
 
       Therefore, when a court is called upon to examine the 
       amount of force used on a pretrial detainee for the 
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       purpose of institutional security, the appropriate 
       analysis is that announced in Whitley and Hudson: 
       whether the measure taken inflicted unnecessary and 
       wanton pain and suffering depends on "whether force 
       was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore 
       discipline, or maliciously and sadistically for the very 
       purpose of causing harm." 
 
Id. Accordingly, we hold that the Eighth Amendment cruel 
and unusual punishments standards found in Whitley v. 
Albers, 475 U. S. 312 (1986) and Hudson v. McMillian, 503 
U. S. 1 (1992), apply to a pretrial detainee's excessive force 
claim arising in the context of a prison disturbance. We can 
draw no logical or practical distinction between a prison 
disturbance involving pretrial detainees, convicted but 
unsentenced inmates, or sentenced inmates. Nor can 
prison guards be expected to draw such precise distinctions 
between classes of inmates when those guards are trying to 
stop a prison disturbance. 
 
Consequently, Fuentes' objections to having to prove 
"wanton pain and suffering" and "an unwise excessive zeal, 
amounting to an abuse of official power," were properly 
overruled. We are not troubled by the court's instruction 
requiring Fuentes to establish that the challenged force was 
motivated by a desire to inflict "wanton pain and suffering." 
That requirement is nothing more than a restatement of the 
requirement that Fuentes establish that the force was 
"inspired by an unwise, excessive zeal, amounting to an 
abuse of official power." That requirement in turn amounts 
to nothing more than the application of force "maliciously 
and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm." 
 
However, Fuentes' objection to having to prove that the 
prison guards' conduct "shocked the conscience," as 
required by the instruction, is somewhat more troublesome. 
Although "shocks the conscience" is a term of art in 
Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process 
jurisprudence, see Rochin v. California, 342 U. S. 165, 172- 
73 (1952), our recent decisions suggest that the standard 
may only apply to police pursuit cases. See Fagan v. City of 
Vineland, 22 F.3d. 1296, 1306 (3d Cir. 1994); see also 
Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1207-08 (3d Cir. 1996) 
("We believe that the Fagan II shocks the conscience 
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standard is limited to police pursuit cases. . . ."). 
Furthermore, in Valencia v. Wiggins, supra, the court 
rejected the contention that a pretrial detainee bringing an 
excessive force claim arising from a prison disturbance had 
to demonstrate that the prison guards' conduct "shocked 
the conscience." 
 
Nonetheless, we believe that, in light of the Supreme 
Court's decision in County of Sacramento v. Lewis, ___ U. 
S. ___, 118 S. Ct. 1708 (1998), the "shocks the conscience" 
standard is not inappropriate to an excessive force claim in 
the context of a prison disturbance. Lewis involved a high 
speed police chase of a motorcycle that ended in the death 
of the passenger of the fleeing motorcycle. The parents of 
the decedent sued under 42 U.S.C. S 1983 alleging that the 
police conduct violated the constitutional rights of the 
decedent. The Court's analysis of the police conduct 
clarifies that the "shocks the conscience" standard of 
culpability applies in those instances where the police 
officer must instantaneously respond to a situation without 
opportunity for reflection on his or her actions. 118 S. Ct. 
at 1721. 
 
In concluding that the "shocks the conscience" standard 
applies to police pursuit cases, the Court analogized the 
police officers' situation in a pursuit case to that of prison 
officials who have to immediately respond to a violent 
prison disturbance to restore and to maintain order and 
security. Id. at 1720 ("The analogy to sudden police chases 
(under the Due Process Clause) would be hard to avoid."). 
 
Moreover, in Hudson v. McMillian, the Court noted that: 
 
       the officials confronted with a prison disturbance must 
       balance the threat unrest poses to inmates, prison 
       workers, administrators, and visitors against the harm 
       inmates may suffer if guards use force. . . . Whether 
       the prison disturbance is a riot or a lesser disruption, 
       corrections officers must balance the need to maintain 
       or restore discipline through force against the risk of 
       injury to inmates. Both situations may require prison 
       officials to act quickly and decisively. Likewise, both 
       implicate the principle that [p]rison administrators 
       . . . should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the 
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       adoption and execution of policies and practices that in 
       their judgment are needed to preserve internal order 
       and discipline and to maintain institutional security. In 
       recognition of these similarities, we hold that whenever 
       prison officials stand accused of using excessive 
       physical force in violation of the Cruel and Unusual 
       Punishments Clause, the core judicial inquiry is . .. 
       whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to 
       maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and 
       sadistically to cause harm. 
 Hudson, 503 U.S. at 6-7 (citations and internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 
Here, Kleeman, Konemann and Donato were faced with 
Fuentes' disruptive and violent behavior for which they 
were not to blame. They could not take time to reason 
through various options to determine the most appropriate 
response. Rather, they had to quickly respond in order to 
quell the disturbance Fuentes was creating, and minimize 
the possibility of an escalating disruption inside the prison. 
Under those circumstances, we believe that the "shocks the 
conscience" test that the Supreme Court has utilized in 
analogous situations, including high speed chases, is the 
appropriate gauge of the conduct. Accordingly, wefind no 
error in the Magistrate Judge's jury instruction. 
 
III. CONCLUSION. 
 
For all of the reasons set forth above, we will affirm. 
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